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IN DEFENSE OF THE DEALERS:  WHY THE SEC 
SHOULD ALLOW SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE 
WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION 
FOR SECURITY-BASED SWAP DEALERS 
John Welling* 
 
Following the 2008–2009 financial crisis, legislators around the world 
enacted laws that regulated the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets 
for the first time.  These laws, though necessary, have duplicative 
requirements that dampen market efficiency.  In the United States, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission is contemplating a “substituted 
compliance” regime with other jurisdictions.  This regime would allow 
market participants to comply with one jurisdiction’s requirements for 
certain transactions, rather than the requirements of multiple jurisdictions.  
This Note argues that the SEC should allow substituted compliance for 
OTC derivatives, but only for dealers located in the United States and 
European Union.  Some advocate for a broader substituted compliance 
regime.  These arguments, however, overlook nuances of the SEC’s 
announced approach.  Others argue that the SEC should avoid substituted 
compliance altogether.  Ultimately, if the SEC allows substituted 
compliance narrowly and thoughtfully, it could preserve the economic 
benefits of a domestic financial market, while preventing some causes of the 
recent financial crisis. 
 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 910 
I.  HOW THEY GOT TO SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE ................................. 913 
A.  OTC Derivatives and Their Role in the Financial Crisis ......... 913 
B.  Almost to Substituted Compliance:  American Legal 
Responses to the OTC Derivatives Market Post-Financial 
Crisis ....................................................................................... 915 
1.  The CFTC’s Regulations and Cross-Border Approach ..... 916 
2.  The SEC’s Regulations In-Depth ....................................... 917 
a.  Capital and Margin Requirements ............................... 918 
b.  Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements ............... 920 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2017, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2011, Tufts University.  
The author would like to thank his family, particularly his uncles Brett and Mark, for their 
knowledge, criticism, and support, and Professor Martin Gelter. 
 
910 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
3.  The SEC’s Cross-Border Approach ................................... 921 
C.  The European Legal Response to OTC Derivatives After the 
Financial Crisis ...................................................................... 923 
1.  Capital and Margin Requirements ..................................... 924 
2.  Remaining Requirements ................................................... 925 
II.  THE UNITED STATES DECIDED OTHER GOVERNMENTS SHOULD 
GET OFF ITS OTC-DERIVATIVES REGULATORY LAWN ................. 927 
A.  Profits for All:  Why the SEC Should Broadly Grant 
Substituted Compliance .......................................................... 928 
1.  Arguments from Market Participants ................................. 928 
2.  Academics Who Advocate for Substituted Compliance 
 . . . or Something Like It .................................................. 930 
a.  Harmonization ............................................................. 930 
b.  Mutual Recognition ...................................................... 931 
c.  Not Maxi-, but Minilateralism ...................................... 932 
B.  Clear and Present Dangers:  Why the SEC Should Not 
Grant Substituted Compliance ................................................ 933 
C.  One Size of OTC Derivatives Regulation Does Not Fit All ...... 935 
III.  A NARROW AND NECESSARY COMPROMISE ...................................... 936 
A.  Why Not Substituted Compliance for All Market 
Participants? ........................................................................... 936 
1.  The Economy, Stupid ......................................................... 937 
2.  What Could Be Lost Without Substituted Compliance ..... 938 
B.  If the European Union, Why Not the World? ............................ 939 
1.  Existing Equivalence ......................................................... 940 
2.  These Equivalent Laws Will Be Enforced ......................... 941 
3.  European and American Market Influence ........................ 942 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 943 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama explained to a crowd in the 
Ronald Regan building that the United States had recently “faced the worst 
recession since the Great Depression.”1  He was referring to the financial 
crisis of 2008–2009 (“financial crisis”), when “[t]ens of millions saw the 
value of their homes and retirement savings plummet” and countless 
businesses were unable to get the loans they needed, forcing many “to shut 
their doors.”2  Of course, the financial devastation was not contained to the 
United States, as people around the world suffered.3  In the aftermath of the 
 
 1. President Barack Obama, Remarks on Signing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-
201000617/pdf/DCPD-201000617.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN46-CVXA]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Directorate-Gen. for Econ. & Fin. Affairs, European Comm’n, Economic Crisis 
in Europe:  Causes, Consequences and Responses, EUR. ECON., Sept. 2009, at 1, 1 (“EU real 
GDP is projected to shrink by some 4% in 2009, the sharpest contraction in its history.”); see 
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financial crisis, it became apparent that there was no singular cause.4  Yet 
no group was more publicly vilified for its role than large financial 
companies.5  Many companies had speculated with over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives.6  They lost tremendous sums, while spreading financial damage 
through the interconnected global markets they had created.7  President 
Obama cited a “failure of responsibility, from certain corners of Wall Street 
to the halls of power in Washington,” as the primary cause of the financial 
crisis.8 
In 2009, leaders from the G209 governments met to discuss the financial 
crisis and to create legislation that would both better regulate their financial 
markets and prevent another crisis.10  Ultimately, they decided each 
jurisdiction would enact its own legislation based upon “shared policy 
objectives”11 rather than a supranational approach by the entire G20.12  In 
 
also Inci Otker-Robe & Anca Maria Podpiera, Seeing the Human Face of the Global 
Financial Crisis, WORLD BANK:  LET’S TALK DEV. (Nov. 4, 2013), 
http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/seeing-human-face-global-financial-crisis 
[https://perma.cc/G6YM-BLCS]. 
 4. See Crash Course, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), http://www.economist.com/ 
news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article 
[https://perma.cc/DBU6-LKGT]. 
 5. See, e.g., Zachary A. Goldfarb, Goldman Sachs Executives Face Senators 
Investigating Role in Financial Crisis, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/27/AR20100427023 
26.html (“It was a day of public flogging for Goldman Sachs.”) [https://perma.cc/TKR5-
WL9M]. 
 6. Shah Gilani, The Real Reason for the Global Financial Crisis . . . the Story No One’s 
Talking About, MONEY MORNING (Sept. 18, 2008), http://moneymorning.com/ 
2008/09/18/credit-default-swaps/ [https://perma.cc/C5Q6-XZ7T].  Financial derivatives are 
instruments that derive value from the performance of an underlying asset, such as a stock or 
commodity. See Financial Derivatives, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/sta/fd/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/278G-VFHX].  The sellers of 
OTC derivatives are referred to as “dealers,” and typically purchasers are referred to as “end 
users.” Sean J. Griffith, Substituted Compliance and Systemic Risk:  How to Make a Global 
Market in Derivatives Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1291, 1298 (2014).  Dealers and end 
users, together “counterparties,” typically use derivatives as a form of hedging, or financial 
risk management. Id. at 1295 (describing derivatives as “a contractual means by which 
parties allocate the risk of a fluctuation in price of an underlying reference asset”); see also 
The Mercatus Energy Pipeline:  The Fundamentals of Oil & Gas Hedging—Swaps, 
MERCATUS ENERGY ADVISORS (July 12, 2016) [hereinafter MERCATUS ENERGY ADVISORS], 
http://www.mercatusenergy.com/blog/bid/86598/The-Fundamentals-of-Oil-Gas-Hedging-
Swaps (discussing the use of swaps, a form of OTC derivative, for hedging) 
[https://perma.cc/2AB5-UR4Q].  Some counterparties speculate with derivatives, however, 
to earn trading profits. See Gilani, supra. 
 7. See Gilani, supra note 6. 
 8. Obama, supra note 1. 
 9. See generally Jamil Mustafa, What Is the G20 and How Does It Work?, TELEGRAPH 
(Sept. 3, 2016, 10:47 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/g20-summit/5075115/G20-
what-is-it-and-how-does-it-work.html [https://perma.cc/TMK9-PHS3].  The G20 members 
include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, the United States of America, and the European Union. Id. 
 10. See generally Leaders’ Statement, G-20, The Pittsburg Summit 1 (Sept. 25, 2009), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-g20/Documents/pittsburgh_ 
summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY3W-TJXB]. 
 11. Id. at 6. 
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the United States, this G20 commitment resulted in the enactment of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act13 (“Dodd-
Frank Act” or “Dodd-Frank”). 
The shared policy objectives of the G20 led to similar legislation across 
its jurisdictions, which in turn created an issue for buyers and sellers of 
OTC derivatives (“market participants”).14  During cross-border 
transactions, market participants must comply with legal requirements that 
are duplicative and not quite uniform, and the totality of compliance 
threatens to undermine the profitability of their OTC derivatives 
businesses.15  The American agencies charged with regulating the OTC 
derivatives market under Dodd-Frank, the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or 
“the Commission”), then faced their own issue.  They could maintain the 
new legal landscape for OTC derivatives, and potentially dampen the 
productivity of the American economy,16 or they could grant some relief to 
the OTC derivatives industry, including many vilified financial companies, 
and hope that their actions would not result in another financial crisis.17 
The CFTC chose to grant relief through “substituted compliance” 
determinations for eight foreign jurisdictions.18  Substituted compliance 
allows certain sellers of OTC derivatives to satisfy American legal 
requirements by satisfying another jurisdiction’s requirements.19  In 2013, 
the SEC announced it would also consider a substituted compliance 
scheme, but to date it has not made any determinations.20  This Note argues 
that the SEC should make a substituted compliance determination, allowing 
certain financial companies to substitute their compliance with European 
OTC derivatives laws for their compliance with equivalent American 
laws.21  Though this would grant relief to financial companies partially 
responsible for the financial crisis, it is a compromise that addresses the 
legitimate issues these companies currently face, the intentions of the G20, 
and the purposes of Dodd-Frank, including protecting the financial markets 
and preventing another crisis.22 
Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of the role of OTC 
derivatives in the financial crisis and the different approaches taken by the 
United States and the European Union to prevent a recurrence of the last 
crisis.  Part II then outlines the arguments in favor and against a substituted 
compliance regime for the regulation of OTC derivatives.  Finally, Part III 
proposes a method of substituted compliance for certain market participants 
 
 12. See generally id. 
 13. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 19. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 20. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. See infra Part III. 
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in a way that balances the risks, rewards, and goals of OTC derivatives 
regulation. 
I.  HOW THEY GOT TO SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE 
Though dealers and end users, known collectively as counterparties, use 
OTC derivatives to mitigate risks, their speculative use by some 
counterparties, especially in cross-border transactions, contributed 
significantly to the financial crisis.23  As discussed, the resulting legislation 
in G20 jurisdictions created cross-border issues that led to the crossroads 
the SEC faces regarding substituted compliance.24  Part I.A begins with a 
summary of the role of OTC derivatives in the financial crisis.  Part I.B 
surveys the legal responses to the financial crisis in the United States, 
beginning with the response of the CFTC and moving to that of the SEC.  
Finally, Part I.C surveys the European Union’s legal response. 
A.  OTC Derivatives 
and Their Role in the Financial Crisis 
OTC derivatives25 are privately negotiated bilateral contracts that trade 
without an intermediary between the counterparties.26  Historically, there 
was no centralized oversight of OTC derivatives markets and little 
government regulation,27 as counterparties used OTC derivatives primarily 
to mitigate risks through hedging.28  In the years leading up to the financial 
crisis, however, some large financial institutions in these decentralized and 
unregulated markets used substantial amounts of OTC derivatives to 
speculate.29  These speculative derivatives predominantly had forms of 
credit as the underlying asset.30  They included the “collateralized debt 
 
 23. See infra Part I.A. 
 24. See infra Part I.A–B. 
 25. The other broad category of derivatives is the exchange-traded derivative, which is 
highly standardized and traded through an intermediary. Griffith, supra note 6, at 1297–98.  
This Note does not focus on exchange-traded derivatives, as they were not a significant 
cause of the financial crisis. See Gilani, supra note 6. 
 26. Griffith, supra note 6, at 1298. 
 27. See generally Leaders’ Statement, G-20, supra note 10. 
 28. See, e.g., MERCATUS ENERGY ADVISORS, supra note 6. 
 29. See Gilani, supra note 6 (writing that the outstanding notional amount of one popular 
form of speculative OTC derivative was $62 trillion according to the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association (ISDA)).  As of 2011, the OTC derivatives market was 
estimated as exceeding $700 trillion of total notional amount, or $20 trillion if all 
transactions were settled simultaneously. John C. Coffee, Jr., Extraterritorial Financial 
Regulation:  Why E.T. Can’t Come Home, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1272 n.38 (2014). 
 30. See Crash Course, supra note 4; see also Griffith, supra note 6, at 1304–06. 
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obligation”31 (CDO) and a subform of the generic “swap,”32 referred to as 
the “credit-default swap”33 (CDS). 
In the United States, financial firms purchased these credit derivatives 
with mortgages as the underlying form of credit.34  When the American real 
estate bubble burst in 2008, borrowers defaulted on the mortgage payments 
underlying the derivatives, which led speculative purchasers to default on 
their payments to other counterparties.35  Given the substantial speculative 
position of some financial institutions,36 losses on credit derivatives 
rendered some of them insolvent and threatened the solvency of others.37  
This led to fears of runs on the financial institutions and, ultimately, to 
bailouts of some institutions by the federal government.38 
Often, these credit derivatives were cross-border transactions,39 which 
exposed American financial institutions to the credit risk of foreign 
counterparties and foreign counterparties to the risk of insolvent American 
institutions.40  The market was interconnected globally.41  Cross-border 
OTC derivatives were the lynchpin of a systemic risk that threatened a 
global financial contagion.42 
The 2009 summit of G20 leaders was an attempt to address the structural 
issues stemming from the financial crisis, including those caused by OTC 
 
 31. Griffith, supra note 6, at 1304–06. 
 32. In a “swap” derivative transaction, counterparties agree to exchange payments based 
on the value of an underlying asset over time. Griffith, supra note 6, at 1295.  Swaps involve 
at least two risks:  (1) the fluctuation in value of the underlying assets and (2) the possibility 
that one counterparty will become insolvent and fail to complete payment under the contract. 
Id. at 1300. 
 33. See Gilani, supra note 6.  Counterparties agree to receive interest payments in 
exchange for insuring against the default of an underlying form of credit (typically a loan or 
bond). See Griffith, supra note 6, at 1298–99.  However, counterparties do not need to lend 
the money for the underlying credit form; thus, CDSs allow counterparties to speculate on 
any form of credit more easily. Id. 
 34. Mortgages were pooled together for use in derivatives. See Crash Course, supra note 
4; see also Griffith, supra note 6, at 1304–06. 
 35. See, e.g., Adam Davidson, The Big Money:  How AIG Fell Apart, REUTERS (Sept. 
19, 2008, 10:27 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/19/us-how-aig-fell-apart-
idUSMAR85972720080919 [https://perma.cc/X4CD-EAHY]. 
 36. Griffith, supra note 6, at 1304 (describing the “overexposure” of financial 
institutions to housing through CDOs). 
 37. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merril is Sold, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/MUA6-XGJS].  Issues over valuing credit 
derivatives also contributed to the losses and ultimate insolvency of financial institutions. 
See Griffith, supra note 6, at 1306. 
 38. See Griffith, supra note 6, at 1307; see also Gilani, supra note 6. 
 39. A cross-border transaction is between two counterparties in different jurisdictions. 
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a71-3 (2016). 
 40. See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1262 (discussing AIG’s purchase of CDSs 
through a British subsidiary). 
 41. See GUILIO GIRARDI, CRAIG LEWIS & MILA GETMANSKY, SEC, 
INTERCONNECTEDNESS IN THE CDS MARKET 1 (2014), https://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/ 
white-papers/credit-defaul-swaps-interconnectivity-04-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/TRW8-
CAW4]. 
 42. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1262. 
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derivatives, and to prevent another crisis.43  They agreed to not only 
regulate the OTC derivatives market within their home jurisdictions44 but 
also to cooperate in regulating the global marketplace.45  Legislation 
throughout the developed financial world ensued.46 
B.  Almost to Substituted Compliance:  American Legal Responses 
to the OTC Derivatives Market Post-Financial Crisis 
To realize the G20 goals for the OTC derivatives market, Congress 
enacted Title VII of Dodd-Frank,47 which amended the Commodity 
Exchange Act48 and the Securities Exchange Act.49  Through Dodd-Frank, 
Congress split regulatory jurisdiction over derivatives between the CFTC 
and the SEC based on the underlying asset of the product.50  The CFTC 
would have jurisdiction over swaps, while the SEC would have jurisdiction 
over “security-based swaps” (SBSs).51  Because the SEC regulates the 
underlying securities, Congress granted oversight over SBSs to the SEC, 
rather than the CFTC.52  Though swaps and SBSs are economically 
similar,53 the split reflected the CFTC’s and SEC’s existing jurisdictional 
scopes.54  Congress also mandated that the SEC and CFTC fully define the 
entities and transactions described in Title VII.55 
 
 43. Leaders’ Statement, G-20, supra note 10, at 7. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pt 7.5A (Austl.); Council 
Regulation 648/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1. 
 47. Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. VII, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641–802 (2010). 
 48. 7 U.S.C. § 1(a) (2012). 
 49. 15 U.S.C. § 78c. 
 50. See generally Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-
Based Swap Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 
77 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 241). 
 51. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(68)(A) (“[T]he term security-based swap means any agreement, 
contract, or transaction that is a swap . . . under section 1(a) of the Commodity Exchange 
Act . . . and is based on . . . the occurrence, nonoccurrence, or extent of the occurrence of an 
event relating to a single issuer of a security or the issuers of securities in a narrow-based 
security index.”). 
 52. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c; see also id. § 78b (“[T]ransactions in securities as commonly 
conducted upon . . . over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public interest 
which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions.”). 
 53. See Dodd-Frank Essentials for End Users of OTC Derivatives—Update 1, SIDLEY 
AUSTIN LLP 1–2 (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.sidley.com/~/media/Files/News/2010/08/ 
What%20Is%20a%20Swap/Files/View%20Update%20in%20PDF%20Format/FileAttachme
nt/investment%20funds%20update%2081710 [https://perma.cc/ZXE2-5JJJ].  Additionally, 
many large financial companies transact in both swaps and SBSs. See, e.g., Don Thompson, 
U.S. Financial Regulatory Reform and the Evolving OTC Landscape, JP MORGAN (Jan. 17, 
2012), https://www.jpmorgan.com/jpmpdf/1320605430085.pdf (discussing the regulatory 
differences between products) [https://perma.cc/M8XX-4LVX]. 
 54. See Derivatives, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml 
(last modified May. 4, 2015) (stating that Congress included SBSs under the definition of 
security by amending the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) 
[https://perma.cc/W9RH-NFC2]. 
 55. 15 U.S.C. § 8302(d)(1) (directing the CFTC and the SEC to further define the terms 
“swap,” “security-based swap,” and “swap dealer”). 
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To fulfill their obligations under Dodd-Frank, the CFTC and SEC had to 
define the limits and requirements applicable to OTC derivatives 
counterparties and determine the operation of those requirements to 
counterparties during cross-border transactions.56  Part I.B.1 below 
summarizes the CFTC’s resulting regulatory scheme and cross-border 
approach.  Part I.B.2 analyzes the SEC’s regulations in-depth, while Part 
I.B.3 summarizes the SEC’s application of its requirements to cross-border 
SBSs. 
1.  The CFTC’s Regulations and Cross-Border Approach 
Under Dodd-Frank, the CFTC eschewed formal rulemaking and adopted 
a regulatory framework through interpretive guidance and policy statements 
that created a set of responsibilities for swaps counterparties.57  It then 
asserted a general policy that these requirements may apply to cross-border 
swaps with a “direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect 
on, commerce of the United States.”58  Though the application of these 
requirements would be flexible,59 the CFTC intended to regulate cross-
border transactions that posed risks to the U.S. economy.60  The result of 
the CFTC’s policy was that foreign counterparties often were subject to the 
CFTC’s requirements when they transacted with American counterparties.61 
The CFTC focused on harmonization with other regulators, as it 
recognized that the swaps market would be regulated for the first time.62  
This included consultation with the SEC “in an effort to increase 
understanding of each other’s regulatory approaches and to harmonize the 
cross-border approaches of the two agencies.”63  The agencies’ objective 
was to coordinate their cross-border approaches “to the greatest extent 
 
 56. See infra Part I.B.1–3. 
 57. See generally Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance 
with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,291 (July 26, 2013) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. ch. 1).  This framework includes numerous transaction-level and entity-level 
requirements for swaps counterparties. See id.  Entity-level requirements apply to a firm as a 
whole, while transaction-level requirements apply to firms on a transaction-by-transaction 
basis. See Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain 
Swap Regulations, CFTC 1–2 http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/ 
documents/file/crossborder_factsheet_final.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/ 
6BHT-QNG9]. 
 58. See Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain 
Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,297. 
 59. See id. (“Unlike a binding rule adopted by the Commission . . . this Guidance is a 
statement of the Commission’s general policy . . . and allows for flexibility in application to 
various situations, including consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances.”). 
 60. See id. at 45,295 (stating that the vulnerabilities stemming from the interconnected 
global swaps market in part demonstrates the need for cross-border swaps regulations); see 
also Edward F. Greene & Ilona Potiha, Examining the Extraterritorial Reach of Dodd-
Frank’s Volcker Rule and Margin Rules for Uncleared Swaps—A Call for Regulatory 
Coordination and Cooperation, 7 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 271, 275–78 (2012). 
 61. See Greene & Potiha, supra note 60, at 282. 
 62. See Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain 
Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,296.  The CFTC also acknowledged “many 
jurisdictions are in differing stages of implementing their regulatory reform.” Id. 
 63. See id. 
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possible.”64  This objective was, however, neither required nor binding on 
either agency.65  The CFTC also coordinated with international regulators 
before releasing its cross-border guidance.66 
In pursuit of global harmonization, the CFTC instituted a substituted 
compliance regime.67  Substituted compliance allows foreign counterparties 
in cross-border transactions to satisfy CFTC regulatory requirements by 
satisfying their home jurisdiction’s regulatory requirements.68  As part of 
this regime, the CFTC issued informal comparability determinations 
between its regulatory requirements and those of foreign jurisdictions.69  
Regulators in the United States had narrowly used substituted compliance 
before,70 so the CFTC’s determinations were not novel.71  The CFTC 
intended its framework to allow foreign regulators latitude for their 
regulatory interests72 and to mitigate the burdens of conflicting or 
duplicative regulations for non-U.S. counterparties.73  Substituted 
compliance would not, however, compromise “the high level of regulation 
contemplated by the Dodd-Frank Act” to protect the United States from 
another financial crisis.74 
2.  The SEC’s Regulations In-Depth 
Pursuant to its rulemaking authority under Dodd-Frank, the SEC 
implemented regulations for SBSs similar to those of the CFTC for 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. (acknowledging the differences between the two agencies’ approaches). 
 66. Id. (recognizing that, in the highly interconnected derivatives market, “risks are 
transmitted across national borders and market participants operate in multiple 
jurisdictions”). 
 67. See Comparability Determinations for Substituted Compliance Purposes, CFTC 
(Dec. 27, 2013), http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/CDSCP/ 
DoddFrankCDF5 [hereinafter CFTC, Comparability Determinations] [https://perma.cc/ 
YY9C-V5HV]. 
 68. See Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain 
Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,340.  Foreign counterparties and regulators are eligible 
to apply for substituted compliance determinations by the CFTC. Id. at 45,344.  The CFTC 
analyzes the applicable foreign laws and regulations to determine potential equivalency 
before granting substituted compliance for a jurisdiction or counterparty. Id. 
 69. See, e.g., Comparability Determination for the European Union:  Certain 
Transaction-Level Requirements, 78 Fed. Reg. 78,878 (Dec. 27, 2013). 
 70. See, e.g., Greene & Potiha, supra note 60, at 310–11.  In 2008, the SEC and an 
Australian regulatory agency implemented substituted compliance for certain stock 
exchanges and broker-dealers in each country to operate without having to comply with 
duplicative regulations. Id. 
 71. In 2013, the CFTC made eight equivalency determinations for other jurisdictions, 
including for both entity and transaction-level requirements in the European Union. See 
CFTC, Comparability Determinations, supra note 67.  This was a series of “broad 
comparability determinations.” Id. 
 72. See Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain 
Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,301, 45,340–41. 
 73. See id. at 45,340–41. 
 74. See id. at 45,340. 
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swaps.75  Like the CFTC, the SEC requires counterparties to register with 
it,76 report information to data repositories,77 and maintain minimum levels 
of capital78 and margin.79  The reporting, recordkeeping, capital, and 
margin requirements are analyzed below. 
a.  Capital and Margin Requirements 
Of the requirements mandated by Dodd-Frank, and derivatives 
regulations globally, capital and margin requirements are especially 
important to commenters.80  Independent “third-party custodian[s]” hold the 
capital and margin funds that counterparties allocate for SBSs in segregated 
accounts.81  The more counterparties allocate funds to satisfy these 
requirements, the fewer funds they have to complete new SBS 
transactions.82  Therefore, duplicative capital and margin requirements can 
 
 75. Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
SEC, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank.shtml (last modified July 7, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/F72R-CJAQ]. 
 76. See e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.15Fb2-1 (2016) (requiring all counterparties to register 
with the SEC as either “security-based swap dealers” or “major security-based swap 
participants”); id. § 242.901 (listing the reporting obligations of counterparties involved in 
SBS transactions).  There are de minimis thresholds for registration with the Commission, 
and, therefore, only dealers and market participants who trade in significant amounts are 
subject to the full panoply of SEC regulations. Fact Sheet:  Defining Swaps-Related Terms, 
SEC, http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/ 
Article/1365171492905 (last modified  July 29, 2014) [https://perma.cc/7YJ7-3X3T]. 
 77. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 78. See Capital requirements are funds specifically designated as a cushion to protect 
against runs by creditors in the event a financial firm’s assets decline or its liabilities rise. 
DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT, BROOKINGS INST., A PRIMER ON BANK CAPITAL (2010), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/1/29-capital-elliott/0129_ 
capital_primer_elliott.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WAP-VXGK]. 
 79. Margin requirements are funds that counterparties must maintain on deposit in their 
accounts for individual trades. See Maintenance Margin Requirement, NASDAQ, 
http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/m/maintenance-margin-requirement (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/V4CL-WE36]. 
 80. See Reopening of Comment Periods for Certain Rulemaking Releases and Policy 
Statement Applicable to Security-Based Swaps, Exchange Act Release No. 34-69,491, 106 
SEC Docket 1080 (Feb. 11, 2014).  The SEC has reopened the comment period for the rules 
as of fall 2016. Id.  The Commission originally proposed capital and margin requirements for 
SBS counterparties in November of 2012. See Capital, Margin, and Segregation 
Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants 
and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,214 (proposed Nov. 23, 
2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 81. 15 U.S.C. § 78c-5(f)(3) (2012). 
 82. See ELLIOT, supra note 78; see also Maintenance Margin Requirement, supra note 
79.  The prudential regulators, which include the Federal Reserve Board, also have 
regulatory interest in the capital of SBS dealers. See Capital, Margin, and Segregation 
Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants 
and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers, 77 Fed. Reg. at 70,217 (“The Commission 
staff consulted with the prudential regulators.”).  Though the requirements of these 
regulators affect the capital of SBS dealers indirectly, see Greene & Potiha, supra note 60, at 
276, these effects are outside the scope of this Note. 
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be administratively inconvenient and profit suppressing for 
counterparties.83 
The SEC’s capital and margin requirements for SBSs are proposed but 
not finalized.84  Under the proposed capital rules, SBS dealers would be 
subject to a separate rule, not applicable to other securities dealers, that 
would protect customer assets and mitigate the risks of counterparty failure 
while allowing firms flexibility in how they conduct business.85  This 
standalone rule would impose a “net liquid assets” test on all SBS dealers, 
requiring the dealers to maintain a minimum level of net capital at all 
times.86  More generally, the capital rules impose substantially higher 
minimum capital requirements for SBS dealers because the use of internal 
models for proprietary transactions can “substantially reduce” some 
standardized deductions prescribed by the rules.87  The Commission is 
especially concerned with the ways SBS dealers value their transactions and 
prescribe capital based off these valuations because of risks that the SBS 
dealers will fail to properly value transactions.88  There are also higher 
minimum requirements for dealers who engage in brokerage activities, as 
compared to those who engage solely in dealing, because of the substantial 
increase in importance and risk of brokerage activities in the securities 
market.89 
For its SBS margin requirements, the SEC also based its approach off of 
preexisting broker-dealer requirements.90  The Commission acknowledged 
it was imposing margin requirements on OTC SBS dealers for the first 
 
 83. See Greene & Potiha, supra note 60, at 300 n.130. 
 84. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 85. See Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap 
Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for Broker-
Dealers, 77 Fed. Reg. at 70,218. 
 86. Id. at 70,219 (“This standard is designed to promote liquidity; the rule allows a 
broker-dealer to engage . . . in a manner that places the firm in the position of holding at all 
times more than one dollar of highly liquid assets for each dollar of unsubordinated liabilities 
(e.g., money owed to customers, counterparties, and creditors).”).  Net capital is highly 
liquid capital, reserves of cash, or liquid securities. Id.  The net capital test requires the 
dealer to determine how much net capital it must maintain over how much it is maintaining. 
Id.  The minimum amount of net capital is the “greater of a fixed-dollar amount specified in 
the rule and an amount determined by applying one of two financial ratios,” either a fifteen-
to-one aggregate debt to net capital ratio or a 2 percent of aggregate debit items ratio. Id.  In 
computing net capital, dealers also would have to make a number of adjustments and 
deductions, including taking prescribed percentage deductions from mark-to-market 
proprietary positions that are included in its tentative net capital. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.  Since dealers have an important position in the SBS market, and, therefore, have 
an increased capacity for perpetuating systemic market risk, they are subject to a more 
stringent net liquid asset test than other market participants. Id. at 70,220 (discussing test for  
MSBSPs). 
 89. Id. at 70,228 (stating that broker-dealers are important intermediaries and that their 
internal models are more risk sensitive, but may not capture all risks).  For those dealers who 
engage solely in dealing, there is a $20 million fixed dollar minimum and $100 million 
tentative net capital requirement, as compared to a $1 billion fixed dollar minimum and $5 
billion tentative net capital requirement for dealers who also engage in brokerage activities. 
Id. at 70,220. 
 90. See id. at 70,259. 
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time.91  Under these rules, counterparties would have to maintain a 
specified level of their transacting partner’s equity in a securities account, 
which they could liquidate to satisfy obligations in instances of 
nonpayment.92  The amount of required funds depends on the nature of the 
transaction and its accompanying risk.93 
b.  Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements 
The SEC announced a number of significant reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements for SBS counterparties in a 2013 release,94 some of which 
were adopted in Regulation SBSR.95  Under these requirements, a 
counterparty must establish, document, and maintain a comprehensive 
“system of internal risk management controls to assist in managing the risks 
associated with its business.”96  They must also implement internal systems 
and controls that establish and enforce procedures to obtain any necessary 
information to perform required functions under the Securities Exchange 
Act and provide this information to the SEC.97 
Building off of these requirements, the SEC requires that counterparties 
keep books and records of all activities related to their SBS business and 
report these books and records to the Commission.98  In addition to 
reporting, counterparties must keep their books and records open to the 
SEC for inspection and examination,99 exercise diligent supervision,100 and 
ensure there are no conflicts of interest with their clients.101  They must also 
have a chief compliance officer and adhere to licensing requirements and 
 
 91. Id. at 70,258 (stating that there would be margin requirements for all SBSs that are 
not cleared).  Under Dodd-Frank, the Commission will impose initial and variation margin. 
Id.  The initiative was to address the fact that some dealers “experienced large 
uncollateralized exposures to counterparties experiencing financial difficulty, which, in turn, 
risked exacerbating the already severe market dislocation” during the financial crisis. Id. 
 92. Id. at 70,259. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR 
and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers 
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. 30,968 (proposed May 23, 2013) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249). 
 95. See Regulation SBSR—Reporting and Dissemination of Security-Based Swap 
Information, 80 Fed. Reg. 14,740 (proposed Mar. 19, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 
242). 
 96. Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR and 
Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and 
Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,013.  These risk management 
systems would require counterparties to formally document trades. Id. 
 97. See id. at 31,013–14. 
 98. See id.  This includes daily trading records, terms and conditions of SBSs, SBS 
trading operations, mechanisms and practices, financial integrity protections, and other 
relevant information. See id. at 31,013. 
 99. See id. at 31,015. 
 100. See id. at 31,014. 
 101. See id. (“Such policies and procedures must establish structural and institutional 
safeguards to ensure that the activities of any person within the firm relating to 
[SBSs] . . . are separated by appropriate informational partitions.”). 
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statutory disqualifications.102  Finally, the SEC has “external business 
conduct standards”103 and requires the segregation of client assets by 
counterparties.104 
3.  The SEC’s Cross-Border Approach 
As the CFTC decided with swaps,105 the SEC elected to subject any 
transactions involving an American counterparty to the above requirements 
for its cross-border approach.106  Therefore, when transacting with 
American counterparties, foreign SBS counterparties had to comply with 
SEC requirements.107 
The Commission stated this approach was “grounded in the text of” 
Dodd-Frank108 but also acknowledged that “cross-border transactions are 
the norm, not the exception.”109  Under the SEC’s cross-border approach, 
foreign counterparties transacting in the United States, and American 
counterparties transacting abroad, faced potentially duplicative 
requirements if another jurisdiction’s requirements were equivalent to those 
of the SEC.110  Duplicative requirements, again, can impair business 
 
 102. Id. at 31,014–15.  Licensing requirements and statutory disqualification prevent 
potential abuse of SBSs by those already disqualified from the industry by statute. See id. at 
31,015. 
 103. Id. at 31,010.  These standards require that SBS dealers “(i) [v]erify that a 
counterparty meets the eligibility standards for an ECP; (ii) disclose to the counterparty 
material information about the security-based swap . . . ; and (iii) provide the counterparty 
with information concerning the daily mark for the security-based swap.” Id. 
 104. See id. (stating that “segregation requirements are designed to identify and protect 
customer property” that SBS counterparties hold as collateral). 
 105. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 106. See Application of “Security-Based Swap Dealer” and “Major Security-Based Swap 
Participant” Definitions to Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 79 Fed. Reg. 
47,278 (Aug. 12, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 241, 250) (“[I]t is appropriate 
to impose the statutory requirements, and rules or regulations thereunder, on security-based 
swap activity occurring within the United States even if certain conduct in connection with 
the security-based swap also occurs in part outside the United States.”); see also Application 
of Certain Title VII Requirements to Security-Based Swap Transactions Connected with a 
Non-U.S. Person’s Dealing Activity That Are Arranged, Negotiated, or Executed by 
Personnel Located in a U.S. Branch or Office or in a U.S. Branch or Office of an Agent, 80 
Fed. Reg. 27,444 (proposed May 13, 2015) (to be codified at 17. C.F.R. pts. 240, 242) 
(defining which types of transactions and counterparties are within the SEC’s jurisdiction). 
 107. See, e.g., Application of “Security-Based Swap Dealer” and “Major Security-Based 
Swap Participant” Definitions to Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 79 Fed. Reg. 
at 47,301 (allowing for the de minimis exception, but requiring registration by non-U.S. 
dealers); see also Application of “Security-Based Swap Dealer” and “Major Security-Based 
Swap Participant” Definitions to Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 80 Fed. Reg. 
at 27,444. 
 108. See Application of “Security-Based Swap Dealer” and “Major Security-Based Swap 
Participant” Definitions to Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 79 Fed. Reg. at 
47,287. 
 109. Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR and 
Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and 
Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. at 30,976. 
 110. Id. at 30,974. 
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efficiency.111  Therefore, the Commission announced that it would consider 
adopting its own substituted compliance framework to address this issue.112 
At adoption of its cross-border guidance, however, the Commission 
stated, “we expect to address issues regarding the availability of substituted 
compliance as part of future rulemakings” in conjunction with the cross-
border application of specific rules.113  It had previously listed the 
necessary Title VII requirements for a substituted compliance 
determination.114  In its proposed capital and margin guidance, the 
Commission did not mention substituted compliance,115 but it has addressed 
the topic in subsequent releases.116 
Though it reviewed the CFTC’s substituted compliance scheme,117 the 
SEC ultimately decided it would only allow substituted compliance in a 
different form.118  It would not complete a rule-by-rule comparison against 
 
 111. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. 
 112. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR 
and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers 
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,085.  The Commission only 
provided guidance and procedures for substituted compliance of SBS dealers, not major SBS 
participants. Id. at 31,088–89. 
 113. Application of “Security-Based Swap Dealer” and “Major Security-Based Swap 
Participant” Definitions to Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 79 Fed. Reg. at 
47,358.  The Commission did adopt a procedural rule for foreign jurisdictions to apply for 
substituted compliance determinations. Id. 
 114. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR 
and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers 
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,088–90.  The requirements 
the Commission listed are those requirements described in Part I.B.2. 
 115. See generally Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based 
Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for 
Broker-Dealers, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,214 (proposed Nov. 23, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pt. 240).  The SEC expects to address the availability of substituted compliance for specific 
requirements in each requirement’s rulemaking. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.  
Thus, the Commission will most likely address the potential for substituted compliance in its 
final capital and margin guidance.  For the purposes of this Note, however, the proposed 
rules are used to assess the SEC’s position on these requirements. 
 116. See Regulation SBSR—Reporting and Dissemination of Security-Based Swap 
Information, Exchange Act Release No. 34-74,244, 2015 WL 1266798, at *152 (Feb. 11 
2015) [hereinafter Regulation SBSR Release No. 34-74244] (“The Commission may issue a 
substituted compliance determination if it finds that the corresponding requirements of the 
foreign regulatory system are comparable to the relevant provisions of Regulation SBSR. . . .  
The availability of substituted compliance is designed to reduce the likelihood of cross-
border market participants being subject to potentially conflicting or duplicative reporting 
requirements.”). 
 117. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR 
and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers 
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,097. 
 118. Id. at 31,088.  Instead of providing informal interpretive guidance like that of the 
CFTC, see supra Part I.B.1, the SEC would undertake formal rulemakings to determine the 
availability of substituted compliance generally and whether specific jurisdictions would 
qualify for it. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation 
SBSR and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap 
Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,087–88.  The 
Commission may only allow substituted compliance after it determines that foreign 
requirements are “comparable” to those of the SEC, id. at 30,088, and are accompanied by 
effective supervisory and enforcement programs, id. at 31,088 n.1119.  It also would require 
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other jurisdictions’ regulations.119  The Commission stated it would focus 
on “regulatory outcomes as a whole.”120  Using its “holistic,” “outcomes-
based” approach, the Commission would have to conclude that another 
jurisdiction had the “reporting of data elements comparable to those 
required” by the Commission.121  It did not, however, assess the 
equivalence of any foreign SBS regulations to its own.122  Currently, it has 
neither made any substituted compliance determinations nor declared 
whether it will make any determinations.123 
C.  The European Legal Response to OTC Derivatives 
After the Financial Crisis 
The European Union, unlike the United States, regulated a small portion 
of the OTC derivatives market prior to the financial crisis through its 
Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments (MiFID 1).124  In 2012, 
however, the European Union enacted the European Markets Infrastructure 
Regulation (EMIR) to focus on OTC derivatives pursuant to the 2009 G20 
agreements,125 along with three directives specifically focused on OTC 
derivatives.126  EMIR implemented several requirements, including 
information and recordkeeping requirements.127  In 2013, a regulation128 
 
a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the foreign jurisdiction’s supervisory and 
enforcement programs. Id. 
 119. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR 
and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers 
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,085. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Regulation SBSR Release No. 34-74244, supra note 116, at *168.  There is also an 
element of practicality in the Commission’s approach.  Given the complexity of American 
and foreign laws, there will inevitably be differences in any comparison. See Cross-Border 
Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR and Certain Rules and 
Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-
Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,085.  An outcomes-based approach, as the 
Commission views it, would be the most efficient approach to achieving the goals of Dodd-
Frank. See id. at 31,085–86. 
 122. See generally id. 
 123. See generally Application of Certain Title VII Requirements to Security-Based Swap 
Transactions Connected with a Non-U.S. Person’s Dealing Activity That Are Arranged, 
Negotiated, or Executed by Personnel Located in a U.S. Branch or Office or in a U.S. 
Branch or Office of an Agent, 80 Fed. Reg. 27,444 (proposed May 13, 2015) (to be codified 
at 17. C.F.R. pts. 240, 242) (stating that certain counterparties would be eligible for 
substituted compliance if a determination were made). 
 124. See Council Directive 2004/39, art. 40, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1, 28. 
 125. See Council Regulation 648/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1, 1. 
 126. Commission Implementing Regulation 1247/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 352) 20; 
Commission Delegated Regulation 148/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 52) 1; Commission Delegated 
Regulation 149/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 52) 11.  In the European Union, member states must 
implement regulations uniformly, however, they have varying degrees of discretion when 
implementing directives, depending on the specific directive. See DELOITTE, CFTC AND EU 
OTC DERIVATIVES REGULATION:  AN OUTCOMES-BASED COMPARISON 5 n.7 (July 2013), 
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/financial-services/deloitte-
uk-fs-cftc-and-eu-otc-derivatives-regulations.pdf [https://perma.cc/VRR8-SN2X]. 
 127. See infra Part I.C.2.  These were similar to SEC requirements, for example the 
reporting of counterparty data to repositories. See, e.g., Council Regulation 148/2013, art. 1, 
annex, 2013 O.J. (L 52) 1, 2, 4 tbl.1. 
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and a directive129 created counterparty capital requirements.130  The 
European Union later amended EMIR through a regulation known as 
“MiFIR,”131 and then enacted “MiFID 2,”132 a companion directive to 
MiFIR that goes into effect January 3, 2018.133  Finally, there are proposed 
regulatory technical standards for counterparty margin requirements under 
EMIR.134 
Pursuant to the 2009 G20 Summit, these European regulations and 
directives established a framework for OTC derivatives dealers similar to 
regulatory frameworks enacted in the United States as a result of Dodd-
Frank.135  Furthermore, regulators in the United States and European Union 
discussed their OTC derivatives frameworks as the process unfolded.136 
As discussed in Part I.B.3, to allow substituted compliance, the SEC must 
find the laws of a foreign jurisdiction equivalent to the requirements 
described in Part I.B.2.  To that end, Part I.C.1–2 summarize the European 
regulations and directives that the SEC would analyze for a substituted 
compliance determination.  As with the SEC’s regulations in Part I.B.2, Part 
I.C.1 summarizes the European capital and margin requirements first, while 
Part I.C.2 summarizes the remaining requirements. 
1.  Capital and Margin Requirements 
The European Union recently proposed new margin requirements for 
OTC derivatives in a public consultation.137  Therefore, between the United 
States and the European Union, the European capital requirements are the 
only enacted laws or regulations for either capital or margin.138 
However, these requirements are similar to the SEC’s proposed capital 
requirements in that they require counterparties maintain a minimum level 
 
 128. Council Regulation 575/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 1. 
 129. Council Directive 2013/36, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 338. 
 130. See ELLIOT, supra note 78 (discussing nature of capital requirements). 
 131. See Council Regulation 600/2014, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 84. 
 132. See Council Directive 2014/65, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349. 
 133. Updated Rules for Markets in Financial Instruments:  MiFID 2, EUR. COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/securities/isd/mifid2/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/4W4X-779U]. 
 134. See ESAs Consult on Margin Requirements for Non Centrally Cleared Derivatives, 
EUR. BANKING AUTHORITY (June 10, 2015), https://www.eba.europa.eu/-/esas-consult-on-
margin-requirements-for-non-centrally-cleared-derivatives [https://perma.cc/WU53-4X 
GR]. 
 135. See DELOITTE, supra note 126. 
 136. See Joint Statement, United States (U.S.)—European Union (EU) Financial Markets 
Regulatory Dialogue (Jan. 30, 2014) [hereinafter Joint Statement], http://ec.europa.eu/ 
finance/general-policy/docs/global/140129_us-eu-joint-statement_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
H249-TQWY].  Regulators from both jurisdictions stressed the importance of implementing 
the G20 commitments for OTC derivatives and minimizing divergences, as well as the need 
to consult with each other. Id. 
 137. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 138. See Council Regulation 575/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 1; Council Directive 2013/36, 
2013 O.J. (L 176) 338. 
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of net capital in a standalone rule.139  They also bring the capital 
requirements in line with the Basel Accords, which generally require 
financial firms to maintain higher levels of capital.140  Additionally, the 
E.U. laws focus on the risks associated with the use of internal models141 
and prudent valuation of transactions overall.142  In its proposed margin 
consultation, the European Union acknowledged it would be introducing 
margin requirements for OTC derivatives.143  It also described the different 
forms of collateral available, and it stated the importance of risk 
management for its margin requirements.144 
2.  Remaining Requirements 
The European Union’s risk management systems provisions are located 
in articles 9 and 11 of EMIR,145 article 16 of MiFID 2,146 and Regulation 
1247 of 2012.147  There are numerous provisions for internal systems and 
control mechanisms as well.148  As for SBS books and records, the 
European Union requires counterparties to maintain that information 
through EMIR,149 three other regulations,150 and MiFIR.151  Counterparties 
 
 139. See Council Regulation 575/2013, art. 412, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 1, 240.  This 
requirement differs from the American capital requirements in that counterparties need not 
keep their capital funds in third-party accounts. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c-5(f)(3) (2012).  
However, counterparties in Europe must still hold the funds and cannot trade with them. See 
Council Regulation 575/2013, art. 412, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 1, 240.  Despite the difference, 
therefore, a duplicative result is created between the two schemes. See id. 
 140. See Council Regulation 575/2013, art. 500, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 1, 284. 
 141. See id. art. 221, at 138. 
 142. See id. art. 105, at 71. 
 143. See ESAs Consult on Margin Requirements for Non Centrally Cleared Derivatives, 
supra note 134. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See Council Regulation 648/2012, art. 9, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1, 20–21 
(“Counterparties . . . shall ensure that the details of any derivative contract they have 
concluded . . . are reported to a trade repository.”); see also id. art. 11, at 22 (“Financial 
counterparties . . . that enter into an OTC derivative contract not cleared by a CCP, shall 
ensure, exercising due diligence, that appropriate procedures . . . are in place to measure, 
monitor and mitigate operation risk and counterparty credit risk.”).  Article 11 also requires 
timely confirmation of OTC derivatives contracts and formalized processes to manage risks 
and disputes between parties. See id. 
 146. See Council Directive 2014/65, art. 13, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349 (stating that firms 
shall maintain effective approval processes, regularly review products that could affect the 
potential risk to markets, and make all appropriate product information available). 
 147. See Council Regulation 1247/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 352) 20 (providing a detailed 
explanation, including trade details and other information counterparties must monitor for 
their OTC derivatives). 
 148. See Council Regulation 648/2012, art. 9, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1, 20 (stating that trade 
information must be available to E.U. regulators); see also id. art. 11, at 22 (stating that 
financial counterparties shall ensure that procedures and arrangements are in place to 
measure, monitor, and mitigate operational and counterparty credit risk); Council Regulation 
1247/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 352) 20 (stating that pertinent trade information be documented). 
 149. See Council Regulation 648/2012, arts. 9, 11, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1, 20–22. 
 150. See Council Regulation 148/2013, art. 1, annex, 2013 O.J. (L 52) 1, 2, 4 tbl.1 (setting 
out details counterparties must provide for trade repositories); Commission Delegated 
Regulation 149/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 52) 11 (mandating that OTC derivatives be confirmed 
electronically to provide adequate records and access to the information); Council 
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must also keep their books and records open to regulators for inspection and 
examination.152  The SEC requires that counterparties exercise diligent 
supervision.153  Counterparties in the European Union must “establish, 
maintain, and enforce a system to supervise . . . diligently[] its business and 
its associated persons”154 through applicable E.U. laws.155  Articles 16.3 
and 23 of MiFID 2 further mandate that counterparties take care to avoid 
conflicts of interest.156 
MiFID 2 also requires that the managers of counterparties define and 
oversee “the implementation of the governance arrangements that ensure 
effective and prudent management” of the firm, and that management be 
involved in compliance issues.157  Regulatory agencies in the European 
Union also reserve the right to refuse authorization for members of 
management to work if they are not of sufficiently good repute, or do not 
possess sufficient knowledge and experience, among other qualifications.158  
Finally, under article 16 of MiFID 2, counterparties in the European Union 
are required to protect clients, make information available to them 
regarding their transactions, and separate client assets from their own 
accounts.159  These are similar to the SEC’s two transaction-level 
 
Regulation 1247/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 352) 20 (mandating that OTC derivatives be reported on 
a daily basis). 
 151. Council Regulation 600/2014, art. 25, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 84, 118 (“Investment firms 
shall keep at disposal of the competent authority, for five years, the relevant data relating to 
all orders and transactions which they have carried out.”). 
 152. See Council Directive 2014/65, art. 16, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349, 397 (“An investment 
firm shall arrange for records to be kept of all . . . transactions undertaken by it which shall 
be sufficient to enable the competent authority to fulfill its supervisory tasks and to perform 
the enforcement actions under this Directive.”). 
 153. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR 
and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers 
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. 30,968, 31,104 (proposed May 
23, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249). 
 154. Id. 
 155. See Council Regulation 648/2012, art. 11, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1, 22 (stating that 
counterparties must implement procedures and arrangements to monitor risks); see also 
Council Directive 2014/65, art. 16, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349, 395 (stating that investment firms 
shall maintain effective approval processes, regularly review products that could affect the 
potential risk to markets, and make all appropriate product information available); Council 
Regulation 648/2012, art. 1, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1, 14 (mandating that counterparties 
arranging or executing transactions must establish and maintain effective arrangements, and 
report anything suspicious to the appropriate regulators). 
 156. See Council Directive 2014/65, art. 16, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349, 396 (“An investment 
firm shall maintain and operate effective organisational and administrative arrangements 
with a view to taking all reasonable steps designed to prevent conflicts of interest.”); see also 
id. art. 23, at 404 (defining conflicts of interest). 
 157. Id. art. 9, at 390. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See id. art. 16, at 395.  Article 11.3 of EMIR also requires that counterparties “shall 
have risk-management procedures that require the timely, accurate and appropriately 
segregated exchange of collateral with respect to OTC derivative contracts.” See Council 
Regulation 648/2012, art. 11, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1, 22. 
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requirements for counterparties, external business conduct standards,160 and 
the segregation of assets.161 
II.  THE UNITED STATES DECIDED 
OTHER GOVERNMENTS SHOULD GET OFF 
ITS OTC-DERIVATIVES REGULATORY LAWN 
The CFTC and SEC broadly applied their cross-border requirements for 
similar reasons.162  They intended to remedy certain realities:  (1) major 
financial firms can escape regulation of their higher-risk operations by 
moving them to foreign jurisdictions; (2) successful regulation of systemic 
risk requires regulation of both counterparties to a trade; (3) some nations 
will profit from assuming the risks of nonregulation, creating “regulatory 
arbitrage”;163 and (4) only major financial jurisdictions can push 
international bodies and foreign jurisdictions, by leveraging territorial 
jurisdiction.164  As the SEC itself stated, however, the OTC derivatives 
market is highly international,165 and substituted compliance could ease the 
burden of duplicative requirements for counterparties in cross-border 
transactions.166  The Commission must, therefore, balance the motivations 
for its territorial approach against the benefits of substituted compliance in 
deciding whether to allow it and in what form.  The decision of whether to 
allow substituted compliance for SBS counterparties, and in what form, is 
the central issue of this Note. 
Support for and against substituted compliance lies across a spectrum.  
There are some SBS industry members who urge the SEC to grant 
substituted compliance broadly in their comment letters.167  Some 
 
 160. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR 
and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers 
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. 30,968, 31,010 (proposed May 
23, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249). 
 161. See id. 
 162. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1277–85. 
 163. Regulatory arbitrage is where other countries allow permissive laws for financial 
firms, becoming “underregulated havens” to attract their business. Id. at 1260. 
 164. Id.  “Territorial” is the term given the regulatory approach adopted by the SEC and 
CFTC that uses the United States as a jurisdictional hook for oversight. Regulation SBSR 
Release No. 34-74244, supra note 116, at *151 (“[T]he Commission continues to believe 
that a territorial approach to the application of Title VII . . . is appropriate.”). 
 165. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR 
and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers 
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. 30,968; see also Coffee, Jr., 
supra note 29, at 1273.  Estimates put the exposure of U.S. bank counterparties to foreign 
counterparties at between 55 and 75 percent of total derivatives exposure. Id.  In 2011, only 
around 7 percent of credit-default swaps were between two U.S. counterparties. Id. at 1273–
74. 
 166. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR 
and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers 
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. at 30,974. 
 167. See, e.g., Investment Company Institute & ICI Global, Comment Letter on Proposed 
Rules on Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR 
and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers 
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academics agree that the correct approach for American regulators to OTC 
derivatives is an internationally coordinated effort like substituted 
compliance.168  On the other end of the spectrum, the SEC also received 
comment letters opposing any sort of substituted compliance determinations 
by the Commission.169  In the middle, at least one academic advocates for a 
diversity of regulatory forms in the OTC derivatives market, a concept both 
in support of, and opposed to, an SEC substituted compliance scheme.170  
These three main positions are summarized, in turn, in Part II.A, II.B, and 
II.C. 
A.  Profits for All:  Why the SEC 
Should Broadly Grant Substituted Compliance 
Often, participants of any industry have the operational knowledge to 
anticipate problems that regulators cannot.  To this end, some SBS market 
participants argue in favor of substituted compliance.  Some academics also 
favor substituted compliance, and their arguments may be more convincing 
as they are not self-interested market participants.  
1.  Arguments from Market Participants 
Many of the commenters that advocate for substituted compliance are 
financial industry advocacy groups.171  These lobbyists promote the 
interests of a set of diverse financial services clients, including both dealers 
and purchasers of SBSs.172  Already familiar with substituted compliance 
from the CFTC, they favored the possibility of substituted compliance with 
the SEC.173  As the cross-border aspects of SEC regulations increase, 
 
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants 11–13 (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/s7-02-13/s70213-43.pdf [https://perma.cc/5H4R-RMZK]. 
 168. See infra Part II.A.2.  Many of these academics’ arguments focus on the CFTC’s 
substituted compliance regime, rather than an SEC scheme.  Their arguments are mainly 
over the substance and philosophy of the concept of substituted compliance, however, and 
not the form of the SEC or CFTC schemes.  These arguments are applicable to the SEC’s 
framework because the Commission has many of the same reasons for substituted 
compliance as the CFTC. 
 169. See infra Part II.B. 
 170. See infra Part II.C. 
 171. See, e.g., ISDA, Comment Letter on Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; 
Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration 
of Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants (Aug. 14, 
2013), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-13/s70213-31.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XTE-9L 
3B]. 
 172. See About ISDA, ISDA, http://www2.isda.org/about-isda/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/45TW-J3PN].  Most major SBS dealers, or a subsidiary entity, are 
members of ISDA. See ISDA Members, ISDA, http://www2.isda.org/membership/members-
list/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/ZAC7-J824].  ISDA also includes other 
professional associations, like law firms, accounting firms, supranational regulators, and 
government agencies. See id. 
 173. See ISDA, supra note 171, at 2 (addressing “the need for harmonization with the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission” and the SEC regarding its proposal of substituted 
compliance). 
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commenters continue to request substituted compliance during rulemaking 
periods.174 
Their advocacy of substituted compliance is motivated by economic 
concerns of overregulation with the SEC’s territorial approach to cross-
border transactions.175  These groups argue that Dodd-Frank’s SBSs 
requirements and those of foreign regulators are substantially similar and, in 
practice, duplicative.176  When counterparties are required to comply with 
the same requirements in multiple jurisdictions, no additional protections 
result, and the extra work inhibits the flow of transactions.177  The SEC 
could solve these business problems by establishing a comprehensive 
substituted compliance framework.178  Additionally, substituted compliance 
would “foster reciprocity and mutual recognition” between the SEC and 
foreign regulators.179  Finally, if American counterparties retreat from the 
global market because of their unwillingness to comply with duplicative 
requirements, it could fragment the markets for SBSs into an American tier 
and a foreign tier.180  This would decrease the overall liquidity of the global 
market.181  Either result could expose the American economy to systemic 
 
 174. ICI Global, Comment Letter on Application of Certain Title VII Requirements to 
Security-Based Swap Transactions Connected with a Non-U.S. Person’s Dealing Activity 
That Are Arranged, Negotiated, or Executed by Personnel Located in a U.S. Branch or 
Office or in a U.S. Branch or Office of an Agent (July 13, 2015), http:// 
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-15/s70615-15.pdf (arguing that the SEC should repropose 
margin rules for counterparties to allow for substituted compliance) 
[https://perma.cc/PGW3-XTBK]; ISDA, Comment Letter on the Proposed Rules, Rule 
Amendments and Guidance on Regulation SBSR—Reporting and Dissemination of 
Security-Based Swap Information 19–20 (May 4, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
03-15/s70315-7.pdf (arguing that territorial requirements should not be imposed until 
relevant substituted compliance determinations have been made) [https://perma.cc/JNH7-
M22K]; see also Institute of International Bankers, Comment Letter on Application of 
Certain Title VII Requirements to Security-Based Swap Transactions Connected with a Non-
U.S. Person’s Dealing Activity That Are Arranged, Negotiated, or Executed by Personnel 
Located in a U.S. Branch or Office or in a U.S. Branch or Office of an Agent (July 13, 
2015), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-15/s70615-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2FG-
NFTU]; Managed Funds Association, Comment Letter on Application of Certain Title VII 
Requirements to Security-Based Swap Transactions Connected with a Non-U.S. Person’s 
Dealing Activity That Are Arranged, Negotiated, or Executed by Personnel Located in a 
U.S. Branch or Office or in a U.S. Branch or Office of an Agent 9 (July 13, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-15/s70615-26.pdf (advocating for the SEC’s approach 
to substituted compliance) [https://perma.cc/68N4-F3HY]. 
 175. See, e.g., ISDA, supra note 174, at 2 (citing the enormous implementation and 
compliance challenges and cost for firms). 
 176. Id. 
 177. See ISDA, Comment Letter on the Application of Certain Title VII Requirements to 
Security-Based Swap Transactions Connected With a Non-U.S. Person’s Dealing Activity 
That Are Arranged, Negotiated, or Executed by Personnel Located in a U.S. Branch or 
Office or in a U.S. Branch or Office of an Agent 5 (July 13, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-15/s70615-20.pdf (“Non-U.S. market participants may 
not wish to subject themselves to the increased burden and complexity of U.S. regulation 
when dealing with non-U.S. counterparties, particularly as they may be subject to 
comparable regulation in their home jurisdictions.”) [https://perma.cc/Y3QD-TVHJ]. 
 178. See generally ISDA, supra note 174. 
 179. See ISDA, supra note 177, at 10. 
 180. Id. at 5. 
 181. Id. 
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risks because American financial companies will continue to rely on the 
credit of foreign companies in other markets.182 
2.  Academics Who Advocate for Substituted Compliance 
 . . . or Something Like It 
Some in the academic community also argue against the SEC’s territorial 
approach to OTC derivatives regulations.183  Instead, they propose broader 
and internationally integrated approaches such as harmonization, mutual 
recognition, and minilateralism.184  Although the academics who argue for 
these approaches may not advocate for substituted compliance 
specifically,185 these approaches have justifications analogous to those for 
substituted compliance.186 
a.  Harmonization 
In cross-border regulatory systems, harmonization seeks to “achieve 
substantial similarity in multiple regulatory systems so that market 
participants face no additional burden in pursuing cross-border 
activities.”187  To begin, harmonization includes a step fundamental to any 
substituted compliance determination188:  the bilateral assessment to 
determine the compatibility of the regulations of two jurisdictions.189  This 
assessment may require discussions to help ensure that no regulatory gaps 
or systemic risks exist.190 
After the initial assessment, efforts by the regulators of the two 
jurisdictions to close gaps between frameworks and make them more 
similar, or even equivalent, is “harmonization.”191  Harmonization, 
 
 182. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1260 (“This is because major financial institutions 
are not only ‘too big to fail’ but also ‘too interconnected to fail.’”). 
 183. See, e.g., id. at 1296–97. 
 184. See infra Part II.A.2.a–c. 
 185. Professor John C. Coffee Jr. argues against substituted compliance as presently 
contemplated but not necessarily against the concept. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 
1298–99.  In contrast, Edward F. Greene has argued directly for implementation of a 
substituted compliance framework. See Edward F. Greene, Beyond Borders:  Time to Tear 
Down the Barriers to Global Investing, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 85 (2007). 
 186. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 187. Greene & Potiha, supra note 60, at 308.  Greene and Potiha wrote specifically about 
the CFTC’s cross-border approach to margin requirements, but this Note generally applies 
their arguments to the SEC’s entire cross-border approach.  Also, Greene and Potiha both 
contribute scholarship and work in private practice and are, therefore, not full-time 
academics. See id. at 271. 
 188. See Greene, supra note 185, at 90–91. 
 189. Id.  This assessment could be done by either a “forest” (generalized) approach or a 
strict rule-by-rule comparison. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id.  Greene believes that a strict rule-by-rule comparison of a jurisdiction’s 
regulations, followed by harmonization of those regulations, would be “indistinguishable 
from a requirement of regulatory convergence,” or two jurisdictions creating requirements in 
tandem. Id. at 91.  He disavows this approach both because Americans should “take pride” in 
their system and because harmonization frustrates a main purpose of any substituted 
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therefore, can go further than substituted compliance, since two 
jurisdictions can converge regulations.192  For example, if regulators at the 
SEC and in the European Union conformed the margin requirements for 
SBSs, then counterparties would calculate and maintain the same levels of 
funds to comply with both jurisdictions.193  Harmonization also could be 
achieved through the implementation of transactional standards by 
supranational regulators.194  In the context of OTC derivatives, this may 
require an international body to set minimum requirements for 
counterparties.195  Minimum requirements through harmonization would 
decrease risks of competition, duplication, and fragmentation.196  In either 
form of harmonization, however, the objectives of substituted compliance 
are also accomplished, as SBS counterparties would be subject to only one 
regulatory scheme.197 
b.  Mutual Recognition 
Conceptually, “mutual recognition”198 is substantially similar to 
substituted compliance.  Edward F. Greene and Ilona Potiha ultimately 
believe mutual recognition, rather than harmonization, is the correct 
approach to cross-border regulatory issues in the United States.199  
Recognition can be unilateral or mutual between jurisdictions.200  Mutual 
recognition by one government, “unilateral recognition,” would result in 
one jurisdiction determining another’s regulations are equivalent to its own 
and, therefore, that no further regulation is required on its part.201 
Greene and Potiha also enumerate risks associated with the territorial 
approach to cross-border transactions.202  Mutual recognition would 
alleviate some of these risks by removing duplicative regulations from 
cross-border transactions, discouraging regulatory arbitrage, and promoting 
 
compliance regime. Id.  Namely, he believes it frustrates the “race to optimality” goal that 
comes from regulatory experimentation. Id. 
 192. See id. 
 193. See supra Part I.B.2.a, I.C.1. 
 194. See Greene & Potiha, supra note 60, at 308. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id.  Greene and Potiha argue that harmonization is unlikely to ever reach its 
theoretical goals, however, because regulators will not set their own requirements quickly 
enough to prevent counterparties from becoming uncompetitive and losing clients. See id. at 
309 n.166. 
 197. See id. at 308 (describing harmonization as a framework “under which the rules can 
operate across borders without unduly restricting cross-border activity and flow of funds”). 
 198. Mutual recognition involves a determination by one jurisdiction that another 
jurisdiction’s regulatory regime is sufficient to regulate counterparties from that jurisdiction 
without additional regulation by the host country regulator. Id. at 310. 
 199. Id. at 310–11.  As discussed, Greene and Potiha use the SEC’s prior substituted 
compliance determination as an example of mutual recognition. See supra note 70 and 
accompanying text. 
 200. See Greene & Potiha, supra note 60, at 310. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 299–304.  These include competitive disadvantages, driving business away, 
duplicative requirements, and market fragmentation. Id.  If the market for SBSs were to 
leave the United States, it could deprive the SEC of oversight over the market. 
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a more coordinated approach to regulation.203  It also encourages some 
differences between laws, as jurisdictions need only find each other’s laws 
“equivalent.”204  Thus, the SEC’s and European Union’s margin 
requirements could be equivalent, even though counterparties in the 
European Union hold funds for capital requirements in their own accounts 
as opposed to the accounts of a third-party custodian under the SEC’s 
requirements.205 
Implementing a mutual recognition scheme, however, would be difficult 
given the technical nature of comparing regimes.206  It also is uncertain 
whether mutual recognition is possible, given that the rationale behind the 
SEC’s territorial approach is the systematic prevention of contagion and 
interconnected risk.207  This rationale creates a “tension” because mutual 
recognition relies on deferring to foreign laws and governments.208  Mutual 
recognition of foreign regulations by American agencies would, ultimately, 
promote the efficiency of cross-border markets by removing duplicative 
requirements.209 
c.  Not Maxi-, but Minilateralism 
Professor John C. Coffee Jr. proposes an alternative approach to 
substituted compliance.210  He believes the costs of substituted compliance 
may outweigh the benefits.211  Instead, Coffee argues that successful 
international collaboration among governments can be achieved through a 
“minilateral” approach to financial regulation.212  Coffee compares the 
territorial approach of American regulators to imperialism, which will be 
resisted in other parts of the world.213  However, the accepted approach of 
 
 203. Id. at 310.  Mutual recognition would, presumably, decrease regulatory arbitrage if it 
was implemented on a large scale but may increase it if implemented only on a smaller scale.  
It would also, however, include an enforcement mechanism not necessarily included in the 
harmonization context. Id. 
 204. Id.  These small differences would allow the benefits of the “race to optimality” of 
regulation described by Edward F. Greene. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 205. See supra Part I.B.2.a, I.C.1. 
 206. See Greene & Potiha, supra note 60, at 310.  Regulators would need to understand 
another jurisdiction’s SBS laws, which would require time and resources, although this 
problem would exist in any substituted compliance determination as well. 
 207. See id. at 311. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 310. 
 210. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1265. 
 211. See id.  In his view, the risks with substituted compliance arise not only because 
financial services companies would seek to escape regulation but also because different 
jurisdictions move at different lawmaking speeds. Id. at 1274, 1299.  A slower decision-
making process is to be expected in Europe, for example, because it is naturally a more 
fragmented polity. Id. 
 212. Id. at 1265.  Minilateralism is contrasted with the more common concept 
“multilateralism,” where countries discuss issues and ultimately forge agreements such as 
treaties. Id. at 1265–66. 
 213. Id. at 1263–65. 
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“soft law”214 does not have the force or speed to solve issues like the causes 
of the financial crisis.215 
A minilateral approach would first ask, “[W]hat is the smallest number of 
nations needed to reach a workable solution to a specific problem?”216  
Regarding systemic risk caused by OTC derivatives, only the major 
financial jurisdictions like the United States and Europe have the incentives 
to address the issues that originated in unregulated OTC derivatives 
markets.217  Therefore, the United States and European Union should act 
minilaterally to define functional equivalence to support substituted 
compliance.218  This could prevent attempts by the SEC to run “roughshod” 
over foreign laws or an attempt by the financial services industry to evade 
Dodd-Frank requirements.219  An agreement between the European Union 
and United States also would provide a template for other jurisdictions to 
follow.220  Finally, if the European Union and United States deny access to 
their financial institutions, these other jurisdictions could be motivated to 
adopt the template by loss of market share.221 
B.  Clear and Present Dangers:  Why the SEC 
Should Not Grant Substituted Compliance 
The commenters who oppose substituted compliance argue that it could 
undermine Dodd-Frank by effectively outsourcing oversight to foreign 
regulators and that it overlooks the potential for systemic risk and financial 
 
 214. Soft laws with respect to issues of financial regulation are “broad, noncompulsory, 
and sometimes aspirational, principles that are announced by international bodies, such as 
the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank.” Id. at 1265. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 1267 (“[T]he United States and the EU have the best incentives for controlling 
systemic risk because they will likely bear the lion’s share of the costs from a financial 
contagion.”).  Other countries with less developed financial infrastructures largely escaped 
damage from OTC derivatives, and other forms of financial engineering, during the financial 
crisis. Id. at 1266. 
 218. Id. at 1267, 1298–99. 
 219. Id. at 1267. 
 220. Id. at 1298 (“In the world of OTC derivatives, an agreement between the United 
States and Europe would effectively compel the rest of the world to conform to their agreed 
standards.”). 
 221. Id. at 1270. 
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contagion.222  These commenters are usually financial industry 
accountability groups223 that desire enforcement of financial laws.224 
First, they argue that foreign OTC derivatives laws may not be 
sufficiently equivalent to American laws to support substituted 
compliance.225  “Even regimes of comparable robustness” will contain 
asymmetries that could generate loopholes, and financial companies are 
“notorious” for finding and exploiting these loopholes.226  For example, 
financial companies may create subsidiaries in different jurisdictions to take 
advantage of different laws.227 
Second, even if foreign laws are sufficiently similar to American laws, 
the Commission has not done enough to ensure that foreign laws are 
enforced similarly.228  The SEC makes only “passing reference” to foreign 
enforcement when it should consider other factors.229  Enforcement of 
existing laws, therefore, concerns these commenters because the laws are 
meaningless without their enforcement.230 
Third, they argue that Congress chose not to establish substituted 
compliance in Dodd-Frank.231  They also criticize the SEC’s process for 
substituted compliance, arguing it is not public or transparent enough, and 
that only after its scheme is subject to more rigorous standards can the 
Commission have “adequate legal or policy justification” for substituted 
 
 222. See, e.g., Americans for Financial Reform, Comment Letter on Cross-Border 
Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR and Certain Rules and 
Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-
Based Swap Participants (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-13/s70213-
54.pdf (“[T]he SEC should not place the interests of financial institutions . . . over the 
statutory mandate of Dodd-Frank.”) [https://perma.cc/7PDG-EPHG]; Better Markets, 
Comment Letter on Cross-Border Security Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of 
Regulation SBSR and Certain Rule and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based 
Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants (Aug. 21, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-13/s70213-42.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJL6-GXC6]. 
 223. See About AFR, AMERICANS FIN. REFORM, http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/about/ (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/2DN3-JJNR]; About Us, BETTER MARKETS, 
https://www.bettermarkets.com/about-us (last visited October 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/ 
2KWL-5MVF]. 
 224. See About AFR, supra note 223 (describing the group as “a nonpartisan and 
nonprofit coalition of more than 200 civil rights, consumer, labor, business, investor, faith-
based, and civic and community groups” formed in the wake of the financial crisis to work 
for a strong and ethical financial system). 
 225. See Better Markets, supra note 222, at 24–29.  They also have “serious concerns 
regarding the procedure for such comparability determinations” laid out in the SEC Cross-
Border proposal. Americans for Financial Reform, supra note 222. 
 226. Better Markets, supra note 222, at 25. 
 227. See id. (discussing the 2,993 subsidiaries JPMorgan Chase uses to exploit regulatory 
differences between jurisdictions around the world). 
 228. Id. at 30–31. 
 229. Id. at 30.  These include “staff expertise, agency funding, agency independence, 
technological capacity, supervision in fact, and enforcement in fact.” Id. at 31.  They also 
argue that enforcement is consistent and ongoing. Id. 
 230. Id. at 32.  Also, they discuss the issue of changes to foreign laws after the SEC has 
allowed substituted compliance. Id. 
 231. See id. at 25. 
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compliance.232  In addition, they criticize the outcomes-based approach.233  
The SEC should use the more “narrow” rule-by-rule comparison approach, 
which will ensure long-term comparability, rather than the “overly vague” 
outcomes test.234 
C.  One Size of OTC Derivatives Regulation Does Not Fit All 
A substituted compliance determination deems the laws of another 
jurisdiction essentially equivalent to, or uniform with, those of the SEC.235  
Professor Sean Griffith argues against uniform global regulation for OTC 
derivatives.236  Providing for a diversity of regulatory approaches offers 
benefits otherwise unavailable in a uniform system.237  To address systemic 
risk, governments must understand that regulators not only make mistakes 
but also often repeat them.238 
A diversity of approaches would allow for compartmentalization of risks 
as regulators in different jurisdictions impose different requirements.239  
This would create the inverse of regulatory arbitrage:  regulators would 
innovate requirements that stem risk and provide information about 
successful approaches rather than opening their borders to companies 
seeking the least regulation, fueling a race toward the regulatory bottom.240  
This could, for example, prevent contagions of the sort that spread to 
American markets through a British subsidiary of AIG.241  Regulators 
around the world, working independently, would pull global regulation 
upward by creating structural barriers to contagion and risk.242 
In comparison, Griffith believes substituted compliance leads to two 
questions:  “[W]hat is sufficiently similar?  And . . . who decides?”243  
Whichever regulatory bodies make the determinations, they should consider 
whether the foreign laws increase systemic risk or undermine the U.S. 
financial system in some other way.244  Ultimately, the decision should not 
 
 232. See id. at 24; see also Americans for Financial Reform, supra note 222. 
 233. See Better Markets, supra note 222, at 30–31. 
 234. See id. at 30. 
 235. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 236. See Griffith, supra note 6, at 1293. 
 237. Id. at 1294.  These include the promotion of innovation, the adoption of efficient 
regulatory structures, and the production of information about different approaches to issues. 
Id. 
 238. Id. at 1347–49. 
 239. Id. at 1372. 
 240. Id. at 1372–73.  Regulatory arbitrage is the malevolent outcome of independent 
systems of regulatory rules over the same financial market. See supra note 163 and 
accompanying text. 
 241. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 242. Griffith, supra note 6, at 1372–73. 
 243. Id. at 1369.  In Griffith’s opinion, neither the CFTC nor the SEC should be making 
substituted compliance determinations. Id. at 1370.  He argues that the review committee 
must be independent of the agency responsible for “drafting and implementing the domestic 
regulation.” Id. 
 244. Id. at 1369.  Griffith also believes that whether the CFTC or SEC makes substituted 
compliance determinations, neither entity’s authority or discretion should extend 
internationally. Id. at 1372. 
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be whether the laws of another jurisdiction are functionally equivalent but 
whether they provide a “robust approach to the underlying problem of 
systemic risk.”245 
III.  A NARROW AND NECESSARY COMPROMISE 
To address the issue surveyed in Part II, this Note proposes that the SEC 
follow the general path of the CFTC246 and institute substituted compliance.  
Because many large financial companies transact in both swaps and 
SBSs,247 they currently operate under two different approaches to cross-
border transactions for economically equivalent products.248  Economic 
efficiency would be increased if these inconsistent approaches were 
remedied through substituted compliance. 
The SEC’s substituted compliance policy, however, should be narrower 
in form than that of the CFTC.  It should grant substituted compliance for 
European dealers, and American dealers with European subsidiaries, 
transacting in cross-border OTC SBSs.  This approach would not only 
fulfill the purposes of Dodd-Frank but also protect against global systemic 
risk while maintaining the competitiveness of American financial 
companies.249 
This resolution is presented in two parts.  Part III.A, argues that 
substituted compliance should be allowed solely for dealers, while Part 
III.B argues that the European Union is the only jurisdiction for which the 
SEC should allow substituted compliance. 
A.  Why Not Substituted Compliance 
for All Market Participants? 
Although substituted compliance can create benefits and prevent issues in 
the SBS markets and the American economy, the risk of another financial 
crisis should prevent the SEC’s extension of substituted compliance beyond 
dealers.  To develop this argument, Part III.A.1 discusses the benefits of 
allowing substituted compliance for dealers.  Part III.A.2 then presents the 
potential risks of the SEC not allowing it for dealers, before ending with 
why the SEC should not allow substituted compliance for other market 
participants. 
 
 245. Id. 
 246. If the Commission undertakes substituted compliance, it will be different in form 
from the CFTC’s scheme. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 247. See Thompson, supra note 53. 
 248. See ISDA, supra note 171, at 4 (citing the uncertainties, confusion, and 
inefficiencies of the differences between the CFTC and SEC). 
 249. This Note adopts a similar position to that of Professor Coffee, see supra Part 
II.A.2.c, but one that differs significantly in form and reasoning, see infra Part III.B. 
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1.  The Economy, Stupid 
Large financial institutions, such as dealers in the SBS market, are 
typically identified as “the cause” of the financial crisis.250  They carry 
massive influence over the market by selling vast quantities of OTC 
SBSs.251  Indeed, they amplified the damage of the financial crisis by 
exposing markets around the world to SBSs.252  As discussed, substituted 
compliance for SBS dealers would allow them to avoid costly regulatory 
requirements and would, therefore, benefit them.253  It would be a 
conspicuous advantage to a group responsible for fundamental causes of the 
financial crisis.254 
The SEC, however, should ultimately harmonize255 with the CFTC, and 
institute substituted compliance.256  First, if the SEC granted substituted 
compliance for another jurisdiction, it affirms that jurisdiction has 
requirements equivalent to those of Dodd-Frank.257  The protections Dodd-
Frank mandates to prevent another financial crisis would, therefore, 
exist.258  Second, current duplicative requirements put American dealers at 
a competitive disadvantage in the market.259  The SEC exempted all but the 
largest dealers of SBSs from its requirements anyway, through the 
minimum thresholds for registration.260  These dealers have the resources to 
avoid SEC regulations by taking advantage of regulatory arbitrage.261  
Alternatively, if the SEC prevents regulatory arbitrage, American dealers 
 
 250. See Crash Course, supra note 4.  Additionally, it is accepted that CDSs and CDOs 
were the financial instruments to blame. See id.; see also Griffith, supra note 6 at 1304–05. 
 251. An estimated 80 percent of SBSs, by notional volume, have ISDA-recognized 
dealers as counterparties on both sides of transactions. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts 
Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Rules (June 25, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/ 
PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370542163722 [https://perma.cc/6ASD-9QAD]. 
 252. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1262. 
 253. See supra Part I.B.3.  This especially includes capital and margin requirements. See 
supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
 254. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1262.  Additionally, there is political stigma that 
can occur with the appearance of support for large financial institutions. See Senator Sherrod 
Brown et al., Comment Letter on Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal 
of Regulation SBSR and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-
Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants 1–2 (May 22, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-13/s70213-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KV6-5JBD]. 
 255. Greene and Potiha described the form this would take. See supra Part.II.A.2.a. 
 256. See CFTC, Comparability Determinations, supra note 67. 
 257. See supra notes 117–21 and accompanying text. 
 258. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR 
and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers 
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. 30,968, 30,972 (proposed May 
23, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249) (“The Dodd-Frank Act was 
enacted . . . to promote the financial stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the financial system.”). 
 259. See Greene & Potiha, supra note 60, at 302 (explaining that “duplicative margin 
collection requirements would make it costly and burdensome to demonstrate compliance” 
with multiple regimes). 
 260. See supra note 76. 
 261. See supra note 164 and accompanying text; see also supra note 226 and 
accompanying text. 
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may decide SBSs are too costly because of the Commission’s 
regulations.262  Dealers would leave the market to create and sell less 
regulated, more profitable products.263  In either scenario, the liquidity of 
the SBS market would diminish, and “fragmentation” would occur.264 
As a result, counterparties would be less able to mitigate risks through 
hedging.265  Their trading profits through speculation also would be 
limited.266  This would be in addition to the losses of SBS profits as 
counterparties left the market due to regulatory costs.  Finally, the SEC 
would have less regulatory oversight in a fragmented market or a market in 
which a substantial number of American SBS dealers exit.  Whether 
through the SBS market or not, large financial companies are inextricably 
connected to other financial companies throughout the world.267  As long as 
the SBS market persists without sufficient oversight, American companies 
and, therefore, the American economy, will be exposed to its risks through 
the exposure of American financial companies to foreign financial 
companies in the numerous other financial markets.268 
2.  What Could Be Lost Without Substituted Compliance 
Some argue the economic benefit provided by American SBS dealers is 
dwarfed by the importance of what is mandated by Dodd-Frank.269  Despite 
the damage of the financial crisis, hedging is fundamental to risk 
management for financial companies, and cross-border SBSs are necessary 
to provide market liquidity for hedging.270  That is why the G20 leaders 
elected to regulate SBSs rather than ban them.271  Though some downplay 
the economic benefits of SBSs, these benefits could be significantly 
reduced by the regulatory burdens of Dodd-Frank.272 
 
 262. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1276–77. 
 263. As Professor Coffee explains, the sophistication of large financial institutions gives 
them options to avoid regulation. See id. at 1262. 
 264. Fragmentation of markets occurs when entities augment their businesses because of 
local regulation, and generally results in decreased safety and liquidity of markets. See 
Greene & Potiha, supra note 60, at 303.  The illiquidity of markets, as discussed, is an issue 
commenters have previously brought up with the Commission as undermining the objectives 
of Dodd-Frank. See ISDA, supra note 179. 
 265. This could also substantially tighten the credit markets, as credit underwriters have 
fewer options to hedge their risk positions. See Ellen Brown, Credit Default Swaps:  
Evolving Financial Meltdown and Derivative Disaster Du Jour, GLOBAL RES. (Dec. 5, 
2012), http://www.globalresearch.ca/credit-default-swaps-evolving-financial-meltdown-and-
derivative-disaster-du-jour/8634 [https://perma.cc/B442-WRP7]. 
 266. Speculation through use of SBSs was a magnifying factor of the financial crisis. See 
supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 267. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1272–74. 
 268. See id.  This includes the risks that led to the financial crisis. See id. 
 269. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra note 6; see also Greene & Potiha, supra note 60, at 290–91. 
 271. See Leaders’ Statement, G-20, supra note 10. 
 272. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1283. 
2016] IN DEFENSE OF THE DEALERS 939 
Furthermore, the loss of American SBS dealers is a risk that could harm 
the economy further.273  If the SEC both diminished the liquidity of the 
SBS market, and effectively ceded jurisdiction over the market, it could 
undermine Dodd-Frank.274  These issues would be avoided through 
substituted compliance, as would the image of American regulatory 
imperialism.275  Substituted compliance would strike a regulatory balance 
between economic benefits and risk protections.276 
Given the advantages substituted compliance creates for the American 
economy, the SEC could grant it broadly to purchasers of SBSs.277  The 
Commission denied this possibility in its initial guidance on substituted 
compliance,278 and it should not extend substituted compliance to all 
market participants at this time.  First, if smaller purchasers exit the market 
because of regulatory costs, it will not harm market liquidity or shrink the 
American economy as much as an exit of large dealers.279  Second, though 
large financial companies can be publicly unpopular, they have more 
incentive to comply with SEC regulations, or equivalent foreign laws, than 
SBS participants.  Large financial firms have visible brands and reputations 
based on public perception of compliance with laws and regulations that 
smaller and less well-known counterparties do not have.280  Finally, the 
absence of regulation was a cause of the financial crisis, and granting 
substituted compliance to all participants could cede oversight for relatively 
minimal economic benefits.281 
B.  If the European Union, Why Not the World? 
The SEC, in striking the correct regulatory balance, could capture most 
of the SBS market through a substituted compliance determination with the 
European Union.282  This is possible because almost all of the large dealers 
 
 273. See id.; see also ISDA, supra note 179, at 5 (stating that dealers may move 
employees out of the United States to avoid “burdensome and duplicative regulation”). 
 274. See supra notes 263–64 and accompanying text. 
 275. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1264 (discussing a prior foreign concern about a 
“tradition of U.S. imperialism under which the United States assumed that its preferred 
financial practices could be mandated for the rest of the world”); see also id. at 1266 (“[T]he 
United States cannot effectively exercise that authority in the face of unified international 
opposition.”). 
 276. See supra notes 250, 254 and accompanying text. 
 277. Some commenters also argue for this. See, e.g., Managed Funds Association, 
Comment Letter on Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of 
Regulation SBSR and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-
Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants 2 (Aug. 19, 2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-13/s70213-34.pdf (stating that substituted compliance 
must “encompass[] all transaction-level requirements that apply to U.S. and non-U.S. 
persons conducting transactions within the United States”) [https://perma.cc/VV4E-N4EQ]. 
 278. See supra note 112. 
 279. This is because the market is heavily based around dealers, who both sell and 
purchase SBSs. See supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
 280. See, e.g., Crash Course, supra note 4. 
 281. See supra Part II.B. 
 282. Although Switzerland is not part of the European Union, the Commission should 
consider it effectively part of the European Union because of its substantial legal and 
economic ties, see Switzerland, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-
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are based in either of the two jurisdictions,283 and most SBSs are between 
two dealers.284  Moreover, the current E.U. SBS laws are equivalent to 
American requirements for dealers using the approach stated by the SEC.285  
Through this limited action, the Commission could provide many of the 
benefits advocated for in Part II, while avoiding many of the risks of its 
territorial approach.286 
Part III.B.1 argues for the equivalence of E.U. laws to SEC regulations.  
Following this, Part III.B.2 analyzes why there are no enforcement issues 
with the European Union. Finally, Part III.B.3 explains why the SEC need 
not make any other substituted compliance determinations. 
1.  Existing Equivalence 
As discussed, the SEC’s outcomes-based approach287 has been criticized 
as vague288 and has never been applied in any public statement by the 
Commission.289  After applying the approach as described by the 
Commission, however, the European Union’s information reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements for SBS dealers are functionally equivalent to 
the SEC’s current regulations under Dodd-Frank.290  This would leave only 
capital and margin requirements for a substituted compliance 
determination.291  As discussed, the European capital requirements are the 
only requirements enacted between both governments for either capital or 
 
and-regions/countries/switzerland/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/ 
NTB7-PPHZ], and grant it substituted compliance as well under the greater umbrella of the 
European Union.  Switzerland is home to two large dealers:  Credit Suisse and UBS.  The 
same is now true of the United Kingdom, which recently departed from the European Union. 
See Fraser Nelson, Brexit:  A Very British Revolution, WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2016, 4:33 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/brexit-a-very-british-revolution-1466800383 [https://perma.cc/ 
3SWU-NAW6].  As of fall 2016, it is too early to know what the United Kingdom’s 
financial regulations and laws will look like after leaving the European Union.  However, 
because the United Kingdom is also home to three large dealers, Barclays Capital, HSBC, 
and RBS, it would be appropriate for the SEC to grant the United Kingdom substituted 
compliance, assuming it maintains its current laws and political status as essentially 
equivalent to the European Union. 
 283. This group of dealers includes the following American-based financial institutions:  
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, 
Citigroup, and Wells Fargo.  It also includes the following European-based (including 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom) financial institutions:  Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, 
Barclays Capital, HSBC, BNP Paribas, the Royal Bank of Scotland, Societe Generale, and 
UBS.  Of the world’s largest dealers, this would leave only the Japanese Nomura and the 
Canadian RBC outside of the ambit of the SEC’s regulations. 
 284. See Application of “Security-Based Swap Dealer” and “Major Security-Based Swap 
Participant” Definitions to Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 79 Fed. Reg. 
47,278, 47,284 n.52 (Aug. 12, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 241, 250) (stating 
that the Commission estimates 80 percent of the SBS market is between thirteen large 
entities). 
 285. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 286. See supra Part II.A. 
 287. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 288. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
 289. See supra notes 109, 123 and accompanying text. 
 290. See supra Part I.C. 
 291. See supra Part I.B.2–3. 
2016] IN DEFENSE OF THE DEALERS 941 
margin.292  It would be in the best interests of the European Union, the 
SEC, and counterparties for the two governments to coordinate regulation 
in efforts that resembled mutual recognition and make them functionally 
equivalent.293  These efforts also would affirm the SEC’s commitment to 
coordination with foreign regulators.294  Based on SEC guidance and the 
current state of European and American capital and margin requirements, 
however, they are functionally equivalent. 
2.  These Equivalent Laws Will Be Enforced 
Even if European SBS laws were equivalent to American laws, however, 
there would need to be equivalent enforcement of them.295  The preliminary 
hurdle in equivalent enforcement is the discretion member states have to 
implement directives.296  If member states implement softer versions, the 
enforcement of directives would differ, and the possibility of regulatory 
arbitrage between member states would increase.297  There are mechanisms 
in the European Union, however, to prevent this from occurring.  First, the 
level of discretion afforded member states differs on a directive-by-
directive basis.298  The pertinent directives at issue in this Note afford little 
discretion to E.U. member states in implementation.299  Additionally, none 
of them have provisions that allow member states to opt out of directives,300 
and these regulations and directives have enforcement provisions.301  The 
European Union also has pan-European legislation to ensure proper 
financial regulation,302 and it already had OTC derivatives regulations in 
MiFID 1 prior to the financial crisis, when the United States had none.303 
There are also political and economic pressures between the United 
States and European Union that help ensure equivalent enforcement.  The 
 
 292. See supra Part I.B–C. 
 293. See supra Part II.A.2.b.  Through this endeavor, the Commission would also be 
applying a purer form of the minilateral approach for which Professor Coffee advocates. See 
supra Part II.A.2.c. 
 294. See, e.g., Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation 
SBSR and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap 
Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. 30,968, 30,974 
(proposed May 23, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249). 
 295. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 297. Regulatory arbitrage is a focus of those opposed to substituted compliance. See 
Americans for Financial Reform, supra note 222. 
 298. See Josephine Hartmann, Discretion in EU Law—A Total Mismatch?, UNIVERSITEIT 
LEIDEN L. BLOG (Feb. 5, 2013), http://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/discretion-in-eu-law-a-total-
mismatch [https://perma.cc/W5TD-2BM9]. 
 299. See, e.g., Council Directive 2004/39, arts. 5, 9–10, 12–13, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1, 12–
14. 
 300. See generally Council Directive 2014/65, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349; Council Directive 
2013/36, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 338; Council Directive 2004/39, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1. 
 301. See Council Directive 2004/39, art. 51, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1, 33 (describing the use 
of criminal sanctions for breaches of the directive); see also Council Regulation 648/2012, 
art. 12, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1, 24. 
 302. See European Economic Area, EFTA, http://www.efta.int/eea (last visited Oct. 16, 
2016) [https://perma.cc/4GKW-GC84]. 
 303. See Council Directive 2004/39, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1. 
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European Union is one of the only other jurisdictions that suffered 
economic consequences from the financial crisis as harsh as the United 
States.304  It also has similar levels of financial and economic development 
as the United States305 and is a close political and economic ally of the 
United States.  Finally, American and European regulators already consult 
on SBS regulations.306 
3.  European and American Market Influence 
Substituted compliance between the SEC and European Union would 
capture the majority of global SBSs within the ambit of Dodd-Frank.  The 
two jurisdictions regulate the majority of the world’s large dealers.307  
These dealers are the largest financial institutions in the world and have vast 
resources in an industry with high regulatory barriers to entry.308  It is, 
therefore, unlikely that dealers would develop rapidly in jurisdictions 
outside of regime’s scope.309  Again, substituted compliance between the 
SEC and the European Union would accomplish sound regulation with 
limited Commission action.310  Given the two jurisdictions’ political and 
economic ties, the ongoing regulatory dialogue also would likely ensure 
flexibility to address any necessary changes in the future.311 
Additionally, many of the incentives for substituted compliance with the 
European Union do not exist for other jurisdictions, and, therefore, the 
Commission should not make any other determinations.  First, it is not clear 
that any other jurisdictions have SBS laws equivalent to the American laws, 
like the European Union does.312  Second, no other jurisdiction has the 
density of large SBS dealers.313  Third, the SEC risks undermining Dodd-
Frank,314 criticism from the public or Congress, and litigation with any 
determination.315  Fourth, the close political and economic ties of the 
United States and European Union do not exist with every jurisdiction in 
the world.316  Therefore, it is harder to rely on the enforcement of 
equivalent laws, or trust other governments to act in a coordinated manner. 
 
 304. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1266. 
 305. See id. 
 306. See Joint Statement, supra note 136.  European and American regulators stressed the 
importance of implementing the G20 commitments for OTC derivatives, minimizing 
divergences to the extent possible and the need to consult with each other. Id. 
 307. See supra note 283. 
 308. See supra notes 225–26 and accompanying text. 
 309. See supra note 283 and accompanying text. 
 310. See supra Part III.B. 
 311. See supra note 306. 
 312. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 313. See supra note 283 and accompanying text. 
 314. See supra Part II.B; see also Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1267 (“At worst, it could 
enable the financial services industry to achieve an effective end run around the Dodd-Frank 
Act’s requirements.”). 
 315. See Brown et al., supra note 254. 
 316. Though the United States obviously has close economic ties with jurisdictions like 
Australia, Canada, and Japan. 
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Other governments also may tailor their SBS laws to Dodd-Frank 
without any further Commission action.  If the SEC and E.U. regulators 
acknowledge a shared framework, it would establish it as the leading 
standard internationally.317  Jurisdictions may adopt a similar framework as 
an attempt to not only properly regulate markets but also create the potential 
for substituted compliance with the SEC.318  Regardless of whether other 
jurisdictions match their laws to Dodd-Frank, foreign dealers will continue 
to transact in the United States and Europe out of necessity.319  The United 
States and European Union have the largest capital markets in the world,320 
and transactions will continue because of precedent.  Other jurisdictions 
could choose to benefit from regulatory arbitrage,321 but it is unlikely given 
the discussed motivations and the nature of the SBS market.  Finally, if 
regulators around the world are left to create individual systems, it could 
provide the compartmentalization of risks brought by regulatory 
diversity.322 
CONCLUSION 
The ruin inflicted by the financial crisis cannot be overstated.  Average 
people who had not participated in the opaque SBS market bore much of 
the financial brunt.323  The motivations of the G20 to enact legislation like 
Dodd-Frank were commendable.324  The unintended consequences of 
Dodd-Frank, however, threaten to erode existing benefits of the financial 
markets.  Given the financial crisis, the global financial markets are better 
served if the SEC maintains as much oversight as is politically and 
economically expedient.  Through substituted compliance with the 
European Union, the SEC would uphold the goals of Dodd-Frank while 
preventing excessive regulation and protecting the competitiveness of the 
American economy. 
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